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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/respondent Bill G. Hendricks, d/b/a/ 
Deseret Roofing Company (hereinafter "Hendricks") contends 
that the issues on appeal are more appropriately formulated 
as follows: 
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary 
judgment dismissing the counterclaim for damages of 
defendant/appellant Interstate Homes, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Interstate")? 
2. Was summary judgment on Hendricks1 complaint 
improper because an issue of fact remains as to the meaning 
of the Rolf Kuepper interoffice memorandum? 
3. Would the existence of Interstate1s counterclaim 
preclude summary judgment on the complaint? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The claims relevant to this appeal are those between 
Hendricks and Interstate. Hendricks1 complaint included: 
(1) a claim for $19,500 plus interest pursuant to a written 
roofing contract with Interstate; and (2) a claim for 
$2,852.14 plus interest for supplemental roofing work not 
covered by the written contract. (Record at 3-7) Hendricks1 
complaint is attached hereto as Appendix 1. Both of 
Hendricks1 claims included claims for attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah's Mechanic Lien Statute. Id. By a 
stipulation entered below, Hendricks1 mechanic's lien was 
released, but his statutory right to claim attorney's fees 
was preserved. (Record at 61-62) 
Interstate counterclaimed for $50,000 in property 
damage allegedly caused by Hendricks1 negligence. (Record at 
27-32) The Answer and Counterclaim filed by Interstate is 
attached hereto as Appendix 2. 
On Hendricks1 motion, the trial court entered two 
summary judgments. The first awarded Hendricks $19,500 plus 
interest on his claim under the written contract. (Record at 
166-167) Supplemental to the first judgment, the trial court 
awarded costs of $495.74 and attorney's fees of $4,813.80. 
(Record at 208-209) The second judgment entered was a 
dismissal of Interstate's counterclaim. (Record at 180-182) 
The two judgments and the award of costs and attorney's fees 
are attached hereto as Appendix 3(a), (b) and (c), 
respectively. 
Both judgments were entered as final judgments under 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, without 
objection from Interstate. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hendricks is a roofer. (Record at 2) Interstate is 
a large manufacturer and builder of modular type buildings. 
(Deposition of Rolf Kurt Kuepper, dated August 7, 1984 
(hereinafter "Kuepper Depo.") at 4) In April of 1983, 
pursuant to a written agreement, Interstate engaged Hendricks 
to assist in roofing one of Interstate's projects -- a motel 
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building in Price, Utah. (Kuepper Depo. at 11, Exhibit 1) A 
copy of the agreement is attached hereto as Appendix 4. 
Under the agreement, Hendricks was to furnish 
certain materials, hereinafter referred to as base felt, to 
Interstate at its factory. (Kuepper Depo. at 11-12, 23, 56, 
Exhibit 1; Affidavit of Bill G. Hendricks (hereinafter 
"Hendricks Affidavit"), 1(4, Record at 106-109) The Hendricks 
Affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix 5. The agreement 
provided that the base felt was to be installed by 
Interstate1s personnel in its factory and that Hendricks was 
not to be involved in that phase of the installation of the 
roof. (Kuepper Depo. at 12-14, 78; Hendricks Affidavit, 1(4) 
The agreement further provided that Hendricks was to complete 
the roof on the motel once the modular sections of the motel 
had been assembled in Price, Utah. (Kuepper Depo. at 10-11; 
Hendricks Affidavit) Finally, the agreement provided that 
Hendricks was to be paid $19,500 and the terms were "cash 
upon completion". (Appendix 4; Kuepper Depo. at 12; 
Hendricks Affidavit, 113) 
Hendricks ordered the base felt materials through 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation (hereinafter 
"Owens-Corning"), and the materials were billed to Hendricks 
but shipped directly from Owens-Corning to Interstate. 
(Kuepper Depo. at 25, 27, Exhibit 3; Hendricks Affidavit, 
K5) Interstate initially received approximately 60 rolls of 
base felt material. These rolls had a paper strap around 
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them which clearly identified the material as "Type 28 
Bondable Base". (Kuepper Depo. at 31, Exhibit 5) A copy of 
this paper strap is attached hereto as Appendix 6. This 
material proved insufficient to cover the modular sections of 
the motel, so Interstate requested Hendricks to supply an 
additional eighteen (18) rolls. (Kuepper Depo. at 25-2(5) 
As requested, Hendricks ordered eighteen (18) rolls 
of base felt from Owens-Corning. (Kuepper Depo. at 26; 
Hendricks Affidavit, 1(7) An invoice reflecting the 
additional eighteen rolls was received by Hendricks and 
Interstate. The invoice reflected that the proper base felt 
material had been shipped by Owens-Corning directly to 
Interstate. (Kuepper Depo. at 26, 27, Exhibit 3) A copy of 
the invoice is attached hereto as Appendix 7. The material 
actually shipped, however, was not the material shown on the 
invoice, but was an intermediate felt known as "Type IV 
Ultra-Ply". (Kuepper Depo. at 27, 29-34, 37, 90, Exhibit 3; 
Hendricks Affidavit, 19) 
The Ultra-Ply felt is porous and is lighter than the 
base felt. When the materials are compared, side by side, 
one can readily feel the difference in the material, and if 
they are held up to the light, one can see a difference in 
the material. (Kuepper Depo. at 65-67) 
When the eighteen rolls of the Ultra-Ply arrived at 
Interstate1s factory from Owens-Corning, each roll had a 
paper strap around it clearly identifying each roll as 
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containing Type IV Ultra-Ply. (Kuepper Depo. at 28-34, 
Exhibit 4) A copy of this paper strap is attached hereto as 
Appendix 8. Interstate1s employees failed to recognize that 
the second delivery contained intermediate felt as opposed to 
base felt. (Kuepper Depo. at 31-32) Hendricks had no notice 
or knowledge that the wrong material had been shipped to and 
used by Interstate. (Hendricks Affidavit, 1110) Interstate 
covered certain modular sections of the motel with Ultra-Ply 
intermediate felt and then transported the modules to the 
property site in Price, Utah. (Kuepper Depo. at 23, 26) 
On June 8, 1983, just two or three days after the 
modules were set in place, there was a rainstorm in Price, 
Utah. The modules covered with the intermediate felt 
sustained water damage to the interiors of the units. 
(Kuepper Depo. at 24, 60, 92) There was no damage where the 
base felt was applied. (Kuepper Depo. at 24, 34, 37, 90, 92) 
Hendricks informed Interstate that while he did not 
believe he was responsible for the water damage, he would 
submit a claim to his liability insurance carrier for the 
damage to the motel. (Kuepper Depo. at 45-46, 70, 71-72; 
Hendricks Affidavit, Kll) In return for submitting the 
insurance claim, Hendricks demanded assurance from Interstate 
that he would be paid in full upon completion of the roof as 
required by the contract. (Kuepper Depo. at 46-47; Hendricks 
Affidavit, 1112) In response to that request, Rolf Kuepper 
prepared an interoffice memorandum on behalf of Interstate, a 
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copy of which was sent to Hendricks. (Kuepper Depo. at 
46-47; Hendricks Affidavit, 1113) That memorandum 
(hereinafter the "Kuepper Memorandumff) states in part 
"payment on this job will not be affected by insurance claim 
in progress". (Kuepper Depo. at 47, 53-55, Exhibit 7; 
Hendricks Affidavit, 1113) The "insurance claim" is the 
damage claim which is the subject of the counterclaim in the 
present action. (Kuepper Depo. at 54) A copy of the Kuepper 
Memorandum is attached hereto as Appendix 9. 
In reliance upon the Kuepper Memorandum, Hendricks 
completed the roof in a manner satisfactory to Interstate. 
(Kuepper Depo. at 49, 94; Deposition of Walter Wood, dated 
August 7, 1984, at 3; Hendricks Affidavit, 1114) Upon 
completion of the roof, Hendricks sent an invoice to 
Interstate for $19,500. (Hendricks Affidavit, 1(15) 
Interstate has refused to pay that invoice because Hendricks' 
insurance carrier has refused to pay the damage claim. 
(Kuepper Depo. at 52) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was proper on the counterclaim 
because Hendricks breached no duty towards Interstate, was 
not negligent in any respect, and did not cause Interstate to 
sustain any damage. Since summary judgment was proper on the 
counterclaim, it was necessarily proper on the complaint. In 
addition, summary judgment on the complaint was proper 
because it is undisputed that Hendricks satisfactorily 
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completed the work called for in his contract, and that 
Interstate specifically agreed that Hendricks was entitled to 
payment immediately upon completion of his work, regardless 
of the damage claim that is the subject of the counterclaim. 
In any event, the existence of the counterclaim would not bar 
summary judgment on the complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the rules of appellate review, the Court must 
affirm the lower court's granting of summary judgment if it 
can do so on any proper ground. Allphin Realty, Inc. v. 
Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979). S£e also 
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 
1982). Thus, Interstate has the burden of showing on appeal 
that no correct finding would sustain the decision of the 
lower court. In this case, several grounds exist to support 
the lower court's granting of summary judgment. 
The dispute in this case centers on the property 
damage to the building Hendricks was to roof for Interstate. 
Interstate's counterclaim alleges this damage was caused by 
Hendricks' negligence. As set forth below, the lower court 
properly granted summary judgment dismissing this 
counterclaim because Hendricks breached no duty toward 
Interstate and did not cause the property damage. 
Interstate also contends that the existence of its 
counterclaim bars summary judgment on Hendricks' complaint 
-7-
for money due under the roofing contract. Since the 
existence of Interstate1s counterclaim is the only matter 
raised in opposition to summary judgment on the complaint, it 
necessarily follows that, if the court affirms summary 
judgment on the counterclaim, summary judgment was also 
proper as to the complaint. Accordingly, this brief will 
first discuss why summary judgment was proper on the 
counterclaim. It will then show that summary judgment would 
be proper on the complaint, even if it were not proper on the 
counterclaim. 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON THE COUNTERCLAIM 
The counterclaim of Interstate asserts a 
negligence claim against Hendricks. However, the record 
is devoid of any supporting facts. 
Hendricks did not have any duty or responsibility 
whatsoever regarding the constructon of the modular units in 
Interstate1s plant. Once the modular units were delivered to 
Price, Utah, Hendricks did have a job of completing the 
roofing on the units. However, he did this in a 
non-negligent, non-careless, satisfactory manner. No one is 
making any claim to the contrary. 
The only other possible theory of recovery against 
Hendricks is that he negligently supplied the wrong roofing 
materials (Type IV Ultra-Ply) to Interstate rather than Type 
28 Bondable Base Felt, and that this Ultra-Ply material 
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failed and as a result water damaged two sections of the 
motel. There is no claim that the rolls of Ultra-Ply roofing 
were defective — only that they should not have been used or 
applied as they were. 
As testified to by Interstate's own representative, 
Rolf Kuepper, Hendricks and Kuepper jointly agreed that base 
felt would be used to cover the modular sections of the motel 
and that this material would be ordered through 
Owens-Corning. Sixty rolls of base felt were ordered, 
shipped directly to Interstate1s plant and applied to the 
modular sections of the model by Interstate1s personnel. 
When the 60 rolls of base felt were used, additional 
work still needed to be done. Therefore, Hendricks ordered 
an additional 18 rolls of base felt from Owens-Corning. 
Shortly thereafter, Hendricks' company, Deseret Roofing 
Company, received an invoice stating that 18 rolls of base 
felt had been sent directly by Owens-Corning to Interstate. 
As noted, a copy of the invoice is attached hereto as 
Appendix 7. 
In actuality, base felt was not sent by 
Owens-Corning to Interstate. Instead, Owens-Corning, 
contrary to its invoice, sent 18 rolls of Type IV Ultra-Ply 
roofing material. This was clearly not the material 
Hendricks had ordered. By reviewing the Owens-Corning 
invoice, Hendricks could not possibly have detected that the 
wrong materials were sent to Interstate. 
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Despite the fact that the Ultra-Ply roofing 
materials were lighter and more porous than the base felt, 
and despite the fact that each roll of Ultra-Ply was clearly 
labeled "Type IV Ultra-Ply", as opposed to Type 28 Bondable 
Base, no one in Interstatefs plant detected the fact that the 
second 18 rolls of roofing materials were not the same as the 
first 60 rolls had been. Therefore, Interstate1s workers 
unrolled the Ultra-Ply and nailed it to the remaining 
unfinished roof areas of the modular units. 
After construction was completed in Interstate1s 
plant, the modular units were shipped to the job site in 
Price, Utah. Within a matter of two or three days after the 
units were set in place, rain fell and water damaged only 
those units where Ultra-Ply material was utilized. 
The facts are simple, straight-forward, clear, and 
undisputed. Hendricks did nothing amiss and was not careless 
or negligent in any way. Summary judgment is a proper method 
for eliminating negligence cases which have no merit. 
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968). 
Unquestionably, the summary judgment which was granted to 
Hendricks in the lower court on the counterclaim which 
Interstate filed was proper. 
On appeal, Interstate seeks to transform its 
negligence counterclaim into a counterclaim sounding in 
contract. However, at no time in the trial court did 
Interstate ask to amend its pleadings to assert a claim for 
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breach of contract. Indeed, Interstate1s claim sounds in 
tort. Interstate cannot change its theory of the case on 
appeal. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 
(Utah 1982); First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State 
University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); Davis v. 
Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970). 
It is undisputed that a contract existed between 
Interstate and Hendricks. As discussed, however, the 
counterclaim brought by Interstate was presented on a theory 
of negligence and no contract claims were made. However, 
even if the counterclaim was construed to be in contract, the 
result is precisely the same. Summary judgment was proper. 
The contract between Interstate and Hendricks must 
be viewed as a two-part contract, one part being for the sale 
of goods and the other part as a construction contract. The 
contract provided that Hendricks would furnish felt and nails 
in an amount normally used for the area involved and that 
this base felt would be nailed in place by Interstate. 
Hendricks was then required to furnish and install shingles 
once the motel units were assembled in Price, Utah. 
Interstate has made no contention that the installation of 
shingles was improperly performed or that it suffered any 
damages as a result thereof. 
As to the sale portion of the contract, there is no 
evidence to indicate that Interstate rejected the goods. In 
fact, the installation of the goods on the units being 
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constructed by Interstate constituted acceptance of the goods 
in conformity with S 70A-2-606, Utah Code Annotated. The 
measure of damages for breach of contract in regard to 
accepted goods is generally the difference between the value 
of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if 
they had been as warranted. Section 70A-2-714(2), Utah Code 
Annotated. 
In this case, there is no evidence suggesting that 
the charges to Interstate for Ultra-Ply would not be 
identical to the charges for the base felt. Therefore, 
Interstate sustained no damages since its remedy simply would 
have been to exchange 18 rolls of Ultra-Ply material for 18 
rolls of base felt. 
The kinds of consequential damages which Interstate 
seeks to recover here can only be recovered under a breach of 
warranty theory. Breach of warranty was never alleged as a 
cause of action in Interstate1s counterclaim and cannot, 
therefore, be argued here. In any event, in a breach of 
warranty action, misuse is an absolute defense. Ernest 
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979); Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 745, 
537 P.2d 807 (1975); Chisholm v. J. R. Simplot Co., 94 
Idaho 628, 495 P.2d 1113 (1972). Here, the evidence is 
undisputed as to misuse. The wrong material (Ultra-Ply) was 
sent by Owens-Corning to Interstate. This Ultra-Ply should 
not have been used to cover plywood or to serve the function 
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of the base felt. Nevertheless, employees of Interstate used 
the Ultra-Ply material as if it were base felt. Water damage 
resulted from the misuse of Ultra-Ply material by Interstate. 
In any claim for damages, be it founded on tort or 
contract, a causal relationship must be shown between the 
conduct of one party and the damages of another. As a matter 
of law, it has not and cannot be shown that any actions of 
Hendricks proximately caused Interstate to sustain damage. 
What is readily apparent from the record is that damages 
sustained by Interstate were caused by Interstate itself. 
The undisputed evidence indicated that Interstate installed 
the felt without notifying Hendricks that the felt had been 
delivered. Interstate did not request Hendricks to inspect 
the felt and, in fact, did not give Hendricks an opportunity 
to do so. Interstate simply has not and cannot point to any 
breach of duty, contractual or otherwise, on the part of 
Hendricks which proximately caused any damage to Interstate. 
In a factually similar case, the Oklahoma Appellate 
Court denied recovery to a buyer for damages caused by 
defective glue. In the case of Davis v. Pumpco, Inc., 
519 P.2d 557 (Okla. App. 1974), plaintiffs were developing a 
mobile home development which required laying approximately 
5,600 feet of water pipe across plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs 
contacted the defendants and purchased from them pipe and 
cement necessary for construction of the water pipe. 
Although the shipping order stated that the proper glue had 
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been shipped, the glue actually sent to the plaintiffs was 
for sewer pipe use only. Nevertheless, plaintiffs1 
contractor used the wrong glue and damage resulted. The 
Appellate Court focused on the problem, saying: 
Therefore, we think the critical issue here 
becomes: Is there in the record evidence from which 
the trial court could find that the buyer before 
using the goods examined them and found or should 
have found them clearly to be unfit or obviously 
inappropriate for the particular purpose, and Lf so, 
did he fail to notify the seller, so that the 
warranty of fitness thereafter ceased to exist? 
In answering this question, the Appellate Court affirmed the 
trial court's judgment of dismissal. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the paper 
strap around each roll of felt clearly identified the 
product. The straps around the first 60 rolls identified 
them as Type 28 Bondable Base. The straps around the 
additional 18 rolls were clearly marked Type IV Ultra-Ply. 
Upon examination of the goods, it would have been readily 
apparent that the last 18 rolls were not Bondable Base and 
should not have been used as they were by Interstate. 
To summarize, Hendricks was not negligent, no 
contractual claim has been properly made against him and even 
assuming a claim based on contract were properly asserted by 
Interstate, such a claim would fail because Hendricks did not 
cause Interstate to suffer any damage. 
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POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON THE COMPLAINT 
A. No Issue of Fact Exists as to the Meaning of the 
Kuepper Memorandum. 
It is not disputed in this case that Hendricks 
contracted with Interstate to perform a roofing contract, and 
in return, Interstate agreed to pay Hendricks $19,500 upon 
completion. Nor is it disputed that Hendricks satisfactorily 
completed the contract. 
It is similarly undisputed that, although Hendricks 
denied responsibility for the damage claim, he agreed to 
submit the claim to his insurance company in exchange for the 
Kuepper Memorandum, a written confirmation of the parties1 
agreement as to payment upon completion of the roofing work. 
Hendricks relied upon that Memorandum in completing the 
roof. However, Interstate refused to pay Hendricks upon 
completion because the insurance company refused to pay the 
damage claim. Interstate now attempts to avoid the Kuepper 
Memorandum by claiming an issue of fact exists as to its 
meaning. 
1. Under the Parol Evidence Rule, Testimony 
Purporting to Contradict the Plain Meaning 
of the Memorandum Would be Inadmissible. 
The Kuepper Memorandum stated in relevant part: "... 
payment on this job will not be affected by insurance 
claim in progress." See Appendix 9. (emphasis added). 
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Interstate claims the deposition testimony and 
affidavit of Rolf Kuepper raises an issue of fact as to the 
meaning of the Kuepper Memorandum, In his deposition, 
Kuepper admits to having authored the Memorandum, but he 
attempts to escape the plain meaning of his words in 
testifying that it was his "understanding" that the insurance 
company would "take care of" the damage claim. (Kuepper 
Depo. at 47) Based upon this "understanding", Interstate now 
contends that Hendricks is no longer entitled to payment upon 
completion because the insurance company refused to pay the 
damage claim. In other words, Interstate would now interpret 
the Kuepper Memorandum to mean "payment on the job will 
be affected by the damage claim". 
Thus, Kuepper's understanding (as offered by 
Interstate) is directly contrary to the unmistakable language 
of the Memorandum. Either the insurance claim does not 
affect payment on the job, as the writing states, or it does, 
as Interstate would interpret Kuepper1s oral testimony. 
Clearly such testimony is not compatible with the writing. 
It is equally clear that such testimony is barred by the 
parol evidence rule. See Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 
P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. 
v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 750 (Utah 1983); E. A. 
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 
144, 145-146 (Utah 1974). 
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Interstate attempts to side-step the rule by arguing 
that the Kuepper Memorandum did not embody the entire 
contract, i.e., it was not integrated. However, whether the 
Memorandum is an integration is immaterial because the 
extrinsic evidence offered here would contradict the terms of 
the writing. If the writing is not 
the complete contract, parol evidence not 
inconsistent with the writing is admissible to 
show what the entire contract really was, by 
supplementing, as distinguished from 
contradicting, the writing. In such a case 
parol evidence to prove the part not reduced to 
writing is admissible, although it is not 
admissible as to the part reduced to writing. 
Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). (emphasis added). In other words, 
extrinsic evidence may be allowed to supplement an ambiguous 
or incomplete written term, but it will not be allowed to 
contradict a written term already clear in its meaning. 
Furthermore, where the subject at issue (the effect 
of the insurance claim on Interstate1s obligation to make 
payment) is "mentioned, covered, or dealt with in the 
writing," the trial court should refuse to admit extrinsic 
evidence "in contradiction" to it. Alexander v. Brown, 
646 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1982). 
Interstate1s reliance on Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1971) is misplaced. 
The issue in Bullfrog was whether a separate written 
employment agreement was in fact interrelated with a written 
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lease. 501 P.2d at 269. Defendant claimed that plaintiff's 
alleged breach of the employment contract allowed him to 
terminate the lease. This Court stated that whether the 
lease was integrated, i.e., "final and complete" in itself, 
or whether it must be interpreted in light of the employment 
contract, was a question of fact. I_d* at 270. 
The fact question in Bullfrog in no way 
authorizes the admission of parol evidence which directly 
contradicts the express terms of the recognized writing. 
Hendricks does not contend that the Kuepper Memorandum 
embodied the complete contract between the parties. 
However, there is no dispute that it was part of the 
contract. Thus, under the law established by this Court, 
Rolf Kuepperfs testimony that the plain language of the 
Memorandum did not accord with his "understanding" is 
inadmissible. 
In short, Interstate is not offering to clarify an 
ambiguity, supply an omission or supplement the contract with 
a consistent additional term. See Farnsworth, 
supra, 665 P.2d at 1293. Its approach is quite simple. 
Through oral testimony of one person's alleged understanding, 
it would interpret the words "not be affected by" to mean "be 
affected by." George Orwell notwithstanding, this evidence 
is barred by the parol evidence rule. 
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2. Regardless of the Parol Evidence Rule, 
Rolf KuepperTs Undisclosed Intentions or 
Understanding Alone Could Not Alter or 
Modify the Agreement? 
Even if the parol evidence rule would not bar Rolf 
Kuepperfs extrinsic testimony, that testimony fails to raise 
an issue of fact as to the meaning or effect of the Kuepper 
Memorandum. When questioned if the Memorandum meant that 
Hendricks was entitled to payment upon completion regardless 
of the insurance company's disposition of the damage claim, 
Kuepper admits: "That is what the memo seems to indicate. 
That is not what I meant to say, but that is what it 
indicates." (Kuepper Depo. at 55) Kuepper attempts to 
qualify the Memorandum by stating that: "my understanding in 
reality was that payment on the job would not be held up 
pending the settlement of the claim but that the insurance 
company would take care of the claim". (Kuepper Depo. at 
47) A similar statement is found in Rolf Kuepper's 
Affidavit. (Kuepper Affidavit, 1(13) Apparently, Interstate 
now claims that payment of the insurance claim somehow became 
a condition to its obligation to pay upon completion. 
However, nowhere in the record is there any indication that 
such a condition became part of the agreement between 
Interstate and Hendricks. Indeed, there is no indication 
that Kuepper1s "understanding" was even communicated to 
Hendricks. 
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It is well established that unexpressed intentions 
do not affect a contract. Jarmillo v. Farmers 
Insurance Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983). The 
apparent mutual assent of the parties to a contract must be 
gathered by the language or acts employed by them, and the 
law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the 
reasonable meaning of his words and acts. Allen v. 
Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 231, 219 P. 539, 541 
(1923). Corbin aptly observes that a party's contractual 
intentions must be determined from his objective behavior, 
not from his internal thought processes: 
Agreement consists of mutual expressions; it does 
not consist of harmonious intentions or state of 
mind. It may well be that intentions and states of 
mind are themselves nothing but chemical reactions 
or electrical discharges in some part of the nervous 
system. It may be that some day we may be able to 
observe a state of mind in the same way that we 
observe chemical processes and electrical 
discharges. At present, however, what we observe 
for judicial purposes is the conduct of the 
parties. We observe this conduct and we describe it 
as the expression of a state of mind. 
A. Corbin, A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules 
of Contract Law S 9 (1963). 
In the present case, there can be no doubt as to the 
reasonable meaning of the words used in the Kuepper 
Memorandum. Rolf Kuepperfs understanding that the insurance 
claim would be "taken care of" was nothing more than an 
understanding. It could not, without more, create an 
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agreement different from that expressed in the Kuepper 
Memorandum. 
B. The Existence of the Counterclaim Would Not Bar 
Summary Judgment on the Complaint. 
If the Court finds that an issue of fact does exist 
as to whether Interstate specifically agreed that the damage 
claim would not affect Hendricks1 right to payment upon 
completion of the contract, it must then decide whether the 
existence of the damage claim as a counterclaim bars summary 
judgment on the complaint. As will be shown below, an 
unresolved counterclaim does not bar summary judgment on the 
complaint where the facts pertaining to the complaint are 
undisputed. Since there is no dispute in the present case 
that Hendricks satisfactorily completed his contract, he is 
entitled to summary judgment on his contract claim regardless 
of the existence of the counterclaim. 
Interstate cites certain general authorities (Am. 
Jur. and A.L.R.) and a federal case decided in 1946 
(Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582 (8th 
Cir. 1946)) for the proposition that a non-frivolous 
counterclaim in excess of the primary claim bars summary 
judgment on the primary claim. Interstate also relies upon 
Bennion v. Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 (1972). 
However, contrary to Interstate1s position, that case states 
that Rule 56 "permits partial adjudications of issues and 
claims" and therefore summary judgment on a complaint is 
-21-
not precluded by the existence of the counterclaim. 500 
P.2d at 516. It is true that Bennion refers to Annot., 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. That annotation recites a two-part "general 
rule" which holds that (1) while a frivolous counterclaim is 
no bar to summary judgment, (2) a "good and substantial" 
counterclaim may bar summary judgment, or may allow the court 
to refuse execution of the judgment while the counterclaim 
remains pending. 8 A.L.R.3d at 1365, 1370. As will be shown 
below, the portion of the above rule that would preclude 
summary judgment on an undisputed claim merely because a 
counterclaim exists is inapplicable under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and under state rules (such as Utah's) 
patterned thereafter. In any event, Bennion did not hold 
that a "good and substantial" counterclaim bars summary 
judgment on the complaint. It merely cited the annotation 
for the proposition that a frivolous counterclaim would not 
bar summary judgment. 
The modern view is reflected in cases decided under 
the present version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
These authorities hold that pendency of an unresolved 
counterclaim, even if it exceeds the primary claim, or 
involves the same transaction as the primary claim, or could 
be advanced as a set-off or a recoupment against the primary 
claim, does not render inappropriate summary judgment on the 
primary claim. See e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. 
Cervantes, 92 F.R.D. 26, (D. P.R. 1981); 
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Electroglas, Inc. v. Dynatex Corp., 473 F.Supp. 1167 
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty 
& Construction Co., 72 F.R.D. 33 (S.D. N.Y. 1976); 
Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323 
(S.D. N.Y. 1969). 
A thorough discussion of the issue, as well as a 
collection of the cases, is contained at 6 Moore's Federal 
Practice, 11 56.17(15), pp. 56-810 -813, and 1984-85 Cum. 
Supp. pp. 54-55. According to Moore's, under former versions 
of the Federal Rules there was some confusion as to when 
judgment could be entered upon a claim without also disposing 
of a counterclaim. _Id. at 56-811 -812. Thus, some old 
cases, such as the Parmelee case relied upon by 
Interstate, held that a non-frivolous counterclaim would bar 
summary judgment on the complaint. 
Moore's points out that under the modern version of 
the Federal Rules, including Rules 54(b), 56 and 62(h), 
summary judgment is appropriate as to any claim that does 
not involve a disputed factual issue. Moore's, supra, at 
56-812, 56-1221 -1222. After summary judgment is granted, 
the trial court may then determine, in its discretion, 
whether final judgment should be entered under Rule 54(b), or 
whether enforcement of the judgment should be stayed under 
Rule 62(h). Id. 
Since Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 56 and 
62(h) are for purposes here identical to their Federal 
-23-
counterparts, the above principles should govern this case. 
There is no dispute here that plaintiff provided a 
satisfactory roof and is entitled to the contract balance of 
$19,500. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in 
granting summary judgment on that claim, and Interstate's 
contention that the mere existence of its counterclaim would 
preclude summary judgment on the complaint is simply without 
merit. 
POINT III 
HENDRICKS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DEFENDING 
THIS APPEAL AS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COMPLAINT 
As noted above, this litigation commenced as a 
complaint by Hendricks to foreclose a mechanic's lien against 
the motel property in question. By stipulation, the 
mechanic's lien was released, but Hendricks' statutory right 
to claim attorney's fees in connection with this action was 
preserved. (Record at 61-62) 
This Court has held on several occasions that 
attorney's fees may be awarded on appeal when authorized by 
statute, or when agreed to by the parties. Rosenlof v.. 
Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Management 
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1980); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1980). Ordinarily, the Court remands to the lower 
court for determination as to the amount of fees to be 
awarded. Id. 
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In the present case, Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute, 
Utah Code Ann, S 38-1-18, as well as the stipulation 
entered below, provide for attorney's fees to Hendricks for 
the successful prosecution of his complaint. Accordingly, 
Hendricks requests the Court to authorize an award of a 
reasonable attorney's fee for defending this appeal as to 
summary judgment on the complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Hendricks is not 
liable for the damage claim as a matter of law; therefore, 
summary judgment on the counterclaim was proper. For that 
reason alone, the Court must also affirm summary judgment on 
the complaint. However, the Court may also affirm on the 
complaint for the separate reasons that (1) no material issue 
of fact exists as to the meaning of the Kuepper Memorandum 
which confirmed that payment upon completion would be 
unaffected by the damage claim, and (2) in any event, the 
existence of the damage claim as a counterclaim would not 
preclude summary judgment on the complaint. Thus, the lower 
court's ruling should be affirmed in all respects. 
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DATED this 2-^ > & day of May, 1985. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
By LP.dxA£L^J&£&. 
W. Cullen Battle 
STRONG & HANNI 
Robert^A. HUrton 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-26-
INDEX TO 
Appendix A 
1 
2 
3(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
APPENDIX 
Subject 
Complaint 
Answer and Counterclaim 
Judgment on Complaint 
Judgment on Counterclaim 
Award of Costs and Attorneys 
Fees 
Original Roofing Contract 
Hendricks Affidavit 
Paper Strap - Base 
Owens-Corning Invoice 
Paper Strap - Ultra-Ply 
Kuepper Memorandum 
-27-
B ^ ^ ^ i r ^ a ^ ^ 
W. Culler*.B^^itf^*'_^ 
FABIAN & CLFNbENXN^-Qt^^ 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
5EV^NTWPfST9icT COURT 
u-,.^.*, CCl^i i, UTAH 
-v«25 a\ 
N^'3^.CH/fiO. CLERK 
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a DESERET 
ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., FRANZ C. 
STANGL III, ELIZABETH ANN STANGL, 
NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, F.A., EMPIRE LAND 
TITLE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I - XX, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
CC 
Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks, d/b/a Deseret Roofing 
Company (hereinafter "Hendricks"), complains of defendants as 
follows: 
I. JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. Hendricks is a resident of Davis County, Utah and 
does business as Deseret Roofing Company in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
2. Defendants Franz C. Stangl III and Elizabeth Ann 
Stangl are the owners of the real property, together with 
improvements, located in Carbon County, Utah, described in Exhibit 
"A" hereto (hereinafter the "Property"). 
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APPENDIX 1 
3. Defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Interstate Homes") is a Utah corporation doing a contracting 
business in the State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Nebraska Savings and Loan Association is a 
Nebraska corporation not registered to do business in Utah. 
5. Defendant Empire Land Title, Inc. is a Utah 
corporation having its principal place of business in Utah County, 
Utah. 
6. The identities of John Does I-XX have not yet been 
ascertained but will be supplied when the same become known to 
plaintiff. 
7. This is an action affecting real property located in 
Carbon County, Utah. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 
through 7 above by this reference. 
9. Interstate Homes was the general contractor employed 
by Franz C. Stangl III to build and construct a motel building 
upon the Property. 
10. On or about April 13, 1983, Hendricks and Interstate 
Homes entered into an agreement whereby Hendricks agreed to 
furnish certain labor and materials necessary to roof the motel 
building located on the Property, and Interstate Homes agreed to 
pay Hendricks the sum of $19,500, together with interest thereon 
at 2% per month from the date of invoice upon completion of the 
work. 
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11. On or about June 14f 1983, said written contract was 
orally supplemented by the parties, pursuant to which Hendricks 
agreed to perform certain additional work towards the roofing of 
the motel building and Interstate Homes agreed to pay the 
reasonable value therefor. The written contract, together with 
the supplemental terms added thereto, shall hereinafter be 
referred to as "the Contract". 
12. Pursuant to the Contract, Hendricks furnished said 
labor and materials as agreed between June 16, 1983 and June 25, 
1983 and has done everything else required of him by the 
Contract. 
13. The reasonable value of the supplemental work 
performed by Hendricks was $2,852.14. On June 27, 1983, Hendricks 
mailed to Interstate Homes invoices totalling $22,352.44 for labor 
and materials provided pursuant to the Contract. 
14. By reason of the foregoing Interstate Homes is 
indebted to Hendricks in the amount of $22,352.44 with interest 
thereon at 2% per month from June 27, 1983 until paid. Interstate 
Homes has failed and refused to pay this amount, notwithstanding 
Hendricks1 numerous demands therefor. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
15. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 
through 14 above by this reference. 
16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et seq., 
Hendricks is entitled to a mechanics lien encumbering the Property 
to secure the amounts owing to him as alleged above, which lien 
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relates back, takes effect and has priority as of the date of 
first work on the Property. The date of the priority of 
Hendricks1 lien is not later than May 15f 1983. 
17. On September 13, 1983, Hendricks caused to be 
recorded in the office of the Carbon County Recorder a Notice of 
Lien encumbering the Property. Said Notice of Lien was recorded 
as Entry No. 000847 in Book B-31, paqes 800-801. A copy of said 
notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
18. Hendricks is entitled to have his mechanic's lien 
foreclosed to secure payment in the sum of $22,352.14, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of 2% per month from June 27, 
1983 until paid, Hendricks' court costs in this action, and a 
reasonable attorneys1 fee. 
19. Defendant Nebraska Savings and Loan Association 
(hereinafter "N.S.L.A.") or defendant Empire Land Title, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Empire") claim or may claim to have a lien upon, or 
an interest in the Property by reason of the following: 
(a) A deed of trust, dated May 20, 1983, to secure 
indebtedness in the amount of $1,500,000.00, and recorded June 
3, 1983, in Book 228, page 681-684, entry no. 168793, of the 
official records of the Carbon County Recorder, under which 
Franz C. Stangl III and Elizabeth Ann Stangl are named 
trustors, Empire is named Trustee, and Richards-Woodbury 
Mortgage Corp. is named Beneficiary. 
(b) An assignment dated May 20, 1983, and recorded 
June 3, 1983, in book 228, page 685-686, entry no. 168794, of 
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the official records of the Carbon County Recorder, wherein 
the beneficial interest in the above-described deed of trust 
was assigned to N.S.L.A. 
20. Such interest or lien of N.S.L.A. or Empire is 
inferior, junior, subordinate to, or invalid as against the 
mechanics lien of Hendricks. 
21. Defendants John Does I-XX each claim or may claim 
to have a lien upon or an interest in the subject premises, but 
each such interest or lien, if any, is inferior, junior, 
subordinate to, or invalid as against the mechanic's lien of 
Hendricks. 
22. A Notice of Lis Pendens giving notice of this action 
has been filed with the office of the Carbon County Recorder, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
23. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 
through 22 above by this reference. 
24. Defendants Franz C. Stangl III and Elizabeth Ann 
Stangl failed to obtain a bond as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 14-2-1 and, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-2 and 14-2-3, 
said defendants are liable to Hendricks for the sum of $22,352.14, 
together with interest thereon at 2% per month from June 27, 1983 
until paid, Hendricks1 court costs in this action, and a 
reasonable attorneys1 fee. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
25. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 
through 24 above by this reference. 
26. The provisions of the Contract, as well as Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-18 (1953), provide for court costs, attorneys' fees 
and other costs of collection to be awarded to Hendircks in this 
action. Hendricks has been required to employ the law firm of 
Fabian & Clendenin to commence this action and is entitled to 
reasonable attorneys' fees as may be determined by the Court as 
well as all other costs and expenses in bringing this action and 
collecting the amounts owed to him. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks, d/b/a Deseret 
Roofing Company prays for a judgment under the First, Second, 
Third and Fourth Causes of Action as follows: 
1. Against defendants Interstate Homes, Franz C. Stangl 
III and Elizabeth Ann Stangl for $22,352.14, together with 
interest thereon at 2% per month from June 27, 1983 until paid, 
for a reasonable attorneys' fees for costs of court and for other 
costs of collection in this action. 
2. For an Order of the Court determining that Hendricks 
holds a valid mechanic's lien on the Property, and determining 
that all other liens and interests held or claimed by defendants 
are inferior, junior or subordinate to, or invalid as against the 
mechanic's lien of Hendricks. 
3. For an Order of the Court foreclosing Hendricks' 
mechanic's lien on the Property and ordering the Property be sold 
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at a public sale, as provided by law, for the satisfactions of 
such sums as are determined to be owing to Hendricks. 
4. For court costs, reasonable attorneys1 fees and other 
costs of collection incurred in this action. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just. 
DATED this ~23 ^ day of January, 1984. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address; 
3957 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
By Ckx^A. 
W. Cullen Bat t l e 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et al, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
OF DEFENDANT INTERSTATE 
HOMES, INC. 
Civil No. 14090 
Defendant Interstate Homes, Inc., answers the 
plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
I 
The Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
which relief can be granted. 
II 
The plaintiff is estopped from recovering any alleged 
damages on the grounds that the plaintiff's failure to roof the 
buildings in accordance with the plans and specifications was the 
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direct and proximate cause of damages suffered by the defendants 
in the amount of approximately $50,000* 
III 
Plaintiff is barred from recovery because of his own 
contributory negligence. In particular, plaintiff failed to 
provide materials that would make the roof "weather tite". The 
materials provided at the instance of the plaintiff did not pre-
vent leaking during inclement weather, directly causing severe 
water damage to the building roofed by plaintiff. 
IV 
This defendant further answers: 
1. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1. 
2. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 2. 
3. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3. 
4. This defendant at this time does not have suf-
ficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations 
contained in paragraph 4* 
5. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 5. 
6. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 6. 
7. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7. 
8. Admits and denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 8, consistent with answers 1 through 7. 
9. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 9. 
10. Admits plaintiff and defendant entered into a writ-
-2-
ten agreement under the terms of which plaintiff was to provide 
labor and materials for a roof for the sum of $19,500. However, 
it was further agreed that payment was conditioned on said roof 
being "weather tite". 
11. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11. 
12. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12. 
13. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13. 
14. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 14. 
15. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 15. 
16. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 16. 
17. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 17. 
18. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 18. 
19. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 19. 
20. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 20. 
21. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 21. 
22. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 22. 
23. Admits and denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 23 consistent with answers 9 through 22. 
24. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 24. 
25. Admits and denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 25 consistent with answers 1 through 24. 
26. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 26. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with preju-
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dice. 
2. That this defendant be awarded its costs, and any 
other relief the Court deems appropriate* 
COUNTERCLAIM 
1. That plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, Utah, 
and does business under the name of Deseret Roofing Company. 
2. That this defendant is a Utah corporation lawfully 
doing business in the State of Utah. 
3. That on or about April 13, 1983 the plaintiff and 
defendant entered into a written contact, including plans and 
specifications, under the terms of which plaintiff was to provide 
materials and labor that would insure the construction of a 
"water tite" roof. 
4. That roofing materials ordered and delivered under 
the direction and control of the plaintiff were delivered to 
defendants place of business for installation. 
5. That subsequent to the installation of the roofing 
materials provided by the plaintiff the buildings were trans-
ported to the final construction site at Price, Carbon County, 
Utah. On or about June 8, 1983 a rain storm occurred at which 
time the rain water penetrated the roofing material and into the 
building, causing damage in the amount of approximately $50,000. 
6. That plaintiff's negligence was the direct and 
proximate cause of the water damage suffered by the defendant. 
-4-
KJ 
7. That the defendant has made demand upon the plain-
tiff for payment of said damages, but the plaintiff has refused 
to pay, all to the damage of the defendant. 
8. That the written agreement between the plaintiff 
and this defendant provides for attorney's fees in the event of 
breach. Defendant is entitled to receive reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays for judgment against the 
plaintiff on its Counterclaim as follows: 
1. In the sum of $50,000, together with accrued 
interest as determined by the Court. 
2. Attorney's fees as determined by the Court. 
3. Costs incurred herein, and any other relief deemed 
appropriate by the Court. 
Dated this 18th day of February, 1984. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By fp) ftff^ 
Henry SJ 'Nygaard 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counterclaimant, Interstate 
Homes, Inc. 
-5-
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STATE OP UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
) 
) SS: 
) 
ALICE ANDERSEN, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. 
herein; that she served the attached Answer and Counterclaim of 
Defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. upon the following named 
individuals by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
W. Cullen Battle, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants Stangl 
466 South 400 East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositng the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on the 18th day of February, 1984. 
QjJjL<JU tf*vC(6M9^> 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of 
February, 1984. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
My Commission Expires: 
7/21/87 
t'.i • 
' •* a - t * V 4 Salt L«k« CoOhry, Ut»h 
DEC 13 1984 
H. Dixon Htndl#VrC2$dLJrd 
frvn..^rLI X ^ i 
Dist^  Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STA^OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a ~~ 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE HOMES INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2993 
(Judge Sawaya) 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Bill G. 
Hendricks having come for hearing before this Court on November 
26, 1984, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, the Court 
having considered pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file, as well as 
the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and having concluded that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 
1. That plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be 
granted and that plaintiff have and recover judgment from the 
defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. the amount of $19,500 with 
interest thereon at the rate of two percent per month from June 
27, 1983 until the date of Judgment, and thereafter at the rate of 
twelve percent per annum until paid. 
LAW OFFICES 
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APPENDIX 3 ( a ) 
2. That plaintiff have and recover judgment from 
defendant interstate Homes, Inc. for his costs and attorney's fees 
reasonably incurred herein, and that plaintiff shall submit a bill 
for such costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the local rules of this Court. 
3. That the Court directs entry of final judgment as to 
plaintiff's claim herein and the Court expressly finds that there 
is no just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment. 
DATED this > ^ d a y of December, 1984. 
BY THE COUB*}: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
W. Cullen Battle 
S.]6ygaa rd 
he Honorable James S. Sawaya 
ATTEST 
*" H.DIXONMINDLSY 
dent 
•1 / 
Ctork 
- 2 -
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TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET 
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2 0 1984 
W. Cullen Battle, A0246 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Robert A. Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
S^ X'-o.cv^ QSJ.. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., FRANZ 
C. STANGL III, ELIZABETH ANN 
STANGL, NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A., EMPIRE 
LAND TITLE, INC., a Utah Corp-
ation, and JOHN DOES I-XX, 
Defendants. 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS 
CORPORATION, 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No£C84-2 993^ 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Third-Party Defendant. 
APPENDIX 3(b) 
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a 
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY and ] 
F. C. STANGLE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, ; 
Defendants. ] 
Civil No. C84-3471 
(Consolidated with C84 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal 
of the counterclaim filed by defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. came 
on for hearing before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, one of the 
judges of the above-entitled court, on November 26, 1984, at 2:00 
P.M. Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys Robert A. Burton 
and W. Cullen Battle. Defendant Interstate Homes,Inc. was 
represented by its attorney, Henry Nygaard. Third-Party Defendant 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation was represented by its attorney, 
Kent Shearer. The court having reviewed the memoranda, affidavits 
and file, heard arguments of counsel, being fully advised, and 
having determined there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and 
with good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
(1) The counterclaim of Interstate Homes, Inc. against 
plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing Company be and 
hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
(2) There is no just reason for delay and the entry of 
final judgment is hereby directed. 
(3) Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing 
131 
Company is granted judgment on the counterclaim in his favor as 
against defendant Interstate Homes, Inc., no cause of action. 
Dated this yC day of December, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: . 
Approved as to form: ^ 
J U D G E 
1 wry, , , ) » * ^ 
Henrty 'S.' Nygaard 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clefk 
tfr..yN' i > V» Deputy Cl«rW 
- 3 -
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret-. Rnnfinrj r^ 
herein; that she served the attached Judcrment 
upon all counsel 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Defendant Interstate Homes 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
W. Cullen Battle 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent Shearer 
Shearer & Carling 
Attorneys for Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 
1000 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the 3rd day of December > 19J-4 • 
J Jo ft LLML 
S ubscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of 
December , 198 4 . "N r\ \ f 
My commission expires: ^ ^  ^ • . 
Notary Public 5/13/85 Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
P L O r c<~r 
"t . L 
/ IAN 1 7 >3S') 
-J 
-f •-> 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILL G. HENDIRCKS, d / b / a DESERET 
jROOFING COMPANY, 
! 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
AND AWARD OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. C-84-2993 
(Judge Sawaya) 
WHEREAS pursuant to the Order and Summary Judgment 
entered herein on December 13, 1984, plaintiff was awarded his 
costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred herein, the amounts 
of which to be submitted in a bill for costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
WHEREAS on December 20, 1984, plaintiff filed with the 
Court and served upon defendant a duly sworn and verified 
'memorandum of costs in the amount of $495.75 and attorney's fees 
i . in the amount of $4,813.80, and 
' WHEREAS defendant has not within the time prescribed by 
i 
.Rule 54(d) filed with the Court any objection to plaintiff's 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees or motion to have such 
l 
,costs or fees taxed by this Court, 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above and good 
cause appearing therefor, 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORAT ON 
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84 1 U 2309 
APPENDIX 3(c) 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment for costs in the 
amount of $495.74 and attorney's fees in the amount of $4,813.80 
jand judgment is hereby entered against defendant Interstate Homes 
for the same. 
DATED this /*7 day of January, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: -
ATTEST
 r )^ / 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY ^ _ • > * 4 ^ * ^ * ^ 
Clafk 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Supplemental Judgment and Award of Costs and 
jAttorney's Fees, postage prepaid, this 14th day of January, 1985, 
to the following: 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Strong and Hanni 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq. 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Kent Shearer, Esq. 
Shearer & Carling 
1000 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/ / / ^ j / 
-2-
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HOTEL PROJECT - PRICE, OTAH 
200 Morth S00 Nest 
Bo. Salt Lake, Utah 
OBSERET R00FI9G COMPART 
3957 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
March 21, 1983 
Customer Preparations As modules are built in customer's plant, the base 
felt is to be nailed in place in accordance with Evans' specifications by 
customer's personnel. Deseret Roofing Company (DRC) to furnish the felt 
and nails in the amount they would normally use for area involved. . DRC is 
not responsible for damage to the base felt at customer's plant, in transit 
or during assembly of the modules in Price. Customer to furnish and 
temporarily install pipe jacks. 
Standard Pitch Roofs t DRC will furnish and install OC twenty (20) year 
limited warranty fiberglass shingles in accordance with manufacturer's 
specifications. Standard galvanised rake metal at gables. Color black, 
red or gray. Valleys to be granulated cap sheet to match the shingles. 
Low-Pitch Roofsi DRC will furnish and install a twenty (20) year 
specification tar and gravel built-up roof to Evans Products Company's spec 
G3-CP20-W. Surfacing to be red lava rock, slag or regular pea gravel. 
Standard galvanized gravelstop at edges. 
NARRABTYs Two (2) Year contactor's warranty on workmanship; twenty (20) 
year OC warranty on shingles. 
PRICES <es3£2ES9t with s^ag surface or regular gravel. 
4 xa> yme.oo 
with fed lava rock surface. 
TERMS: Cash upon completion. Interest 8 2% per month from date of invoice 
will charged if not promptly paid. 
DATES *T^i 
EOTBs This bid is good until March 31, 1983. (8% material increase 
scheduled.) 
APPENDIX 4 
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BILL G. 
DESERET 
v. 
HENDRICKS, d/b/a 
ROOFING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et 
Defendants. 
al. , j 
W. Cullen Battle, A0246 »• C!£f 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF BILL G. 
HENDRICKS IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT INTERSTATE HOMES, 
INC. 
Civil No. C-84-2993 
(Judge Sawaya) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BILL G. HENDRICKS deposes and says: 
1. That he is a resident of Davis County, Utah, over the 
age of 21 years, and fully competent to make this affidavit. 
2. That he does business in Salt Lake County, Utah, as 
Deseret Roofing Company. 
3. That on or about April 13, 1983, affiant and Inter-
state Homes entered into an agreement whereby affiant agreed to 
furnish certain labor and materials necessary to roof a motel to be 
built in Price, Utah. Interstate Homes agreed to pay affiant the 
sum of $19,500.00, together with interest thereon at 2% per month 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84 11 1 2309 
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from the date of invoice upon completion of the work. 
4. That as a part of that agreement affiant was to fur-
nish materials, hereinafter referred to as base felt, to Interstate 
Homes at its factory. It was agreed that the base felt was to be 
installed by Interstate Homes' personnel in its factory and that 
affiant was not to be involved in that phase of the installation of 
the roof. 
5. That affiant ordered the base felt materials through 
Owens-Corning. The materials were billed to affiant but shipped 
directly from Owens-Corning to Interstate Homes. 
6. That Interstate Homes requested that affiant furnish 
an additional 18 rolls of base felt. 
7. That affiant ordered 18 rolls of base felt from 
Owens-Corning. 
8. That affiant received a shipping order from Owens-
Corning that showed that 18 rolls of base felt had been shipped 
directly to Interstate Homes. 
9. That on or around June 9, 1983, affiant learned from 
Interstate Homes that the eighteen rolls that had been shipped 
contained intermediate felt rather than base felt, that Interstate 
Homes had applied the intermediate felt to certain modular units of 
the motel and that as a result said units sustained water damage 
during a rainstorm in Price, Utah. 
10. That affiant, prior to June 9, 1983, had no notice or 
knowledge that 18 rolls of intermediate felt had been shipped to 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET * j j / \ " * ? 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84 1 11 2309 • * " 
Interstate Homes instead of 18 rolls of base felt. 
11. That affiant informed Interstate Homes that while he 
did not believe that he was responsible for the water damage caused 
by the use of the intermediate felt he would submit a claim to his 
insurance carrier for the damage to the motel. 
12. That in return for submitting said insurance claim, 
affiant demanded assurance from Interstate Homes that he would be 
paid pursuant to the original agreement upon completion of the roof. 
13. That following said demand, affiant received from 
Interstate Homes an inter-office memorandum, which stated in part 
"that payment on this job will not be affected by insurance claims iii 
progress." 
14. That in reliance upon the representations contained im 
said memorandum affiant completed the roof. 
15. That upon completion of the work affiant sent an 
invoice to Interstate Homes for the $19,500.00 as agreed. That 
invoice has not been paid by Interstate Homes. 
16. That on or about June 9, 1983, Interstate Homes 
requested that affiant perform additional work necessitated by the 
water damage to the motel. Interstate Homes agreed to pay the 
reasonable value of the work performed. 
17. That affiant performed the additional work requested 
by Interstate Homes. 
18. That the reasonable value of the additional work is 
$2,852.14. 
19. That affiant sent an invoice to Interstate Homes for 
LAW 6>F«CES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION I 
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET Q { ' f f i 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 64 1 11 2309 T 
the additional work requested by Interstate Homes. 
20. That as of the date of this affidavit Interstate 
Homes has failed to pay for any of the work performed by affiant. 
DATED this ^ ^\J^-sday of C P e 3 ^ c A > * - ^ , 1984. 
/QjJu. A./duduAA^ 
Bill G. Hendricks 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me t h i s ' ^ & t j V t f a y of 
, 1 9 8 4 . 
^ f~\ W-
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC • », • . 
Residing at ^cxQjj^. V/^^J^S^JK 
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TYPE G2 
COATED CAP, OR BASE SHEET 
FOR BUILT-UP ROOF COVERINGS 
This product meets all mill manufacturing requirements 
for No 1 material and complies with all applicable 
requirements of UI-55A Standard Specification; the 
Uniform Building Code Standard 32-1, A S T AA Stand-
ard Specification 0 2178-76 and Federal Specification 
SS-R-620 6. Apply according to CVRHS PROOUCTS 
COmP*nv Published Specifications. 
IMPORTANT 
HANDLING AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS 
A. Store off the ground end protept front the weather. 
B. Apply only to dry, clean, smooth turtaces. 
C. Do not apply damp or wet materials. 
0. Oo not apply wrinkled or cracked materials. 
E. Weather conditions such as temperature, sun. wind, etc., 
must be given consideration. If the tempereture drops below 
50°F., cracking, wrinkling, nonadheslon, and fish mouths 
are more likely to occur. 
F. Apply in hot asphalt as pert of an assembly in accordance 
with evnns PRODUCTS I peRmjRGLRs 
published specifications. 
G. Do not lay on sides. Stend on ends only. 
H. Do not store more than two pallets high. 
evnns PRODUCTS company cennot be responsible for 
results when the above precautions are not taken. 
(32\€vnnsi PGRITIRGLRS 
POST OFFICE BOX E", CORVALLIS, OREGON 97339 
Owens-Coming Supply Division FlBERGlAS 
Full Service Building Material Suppliers 
To Meet Your Growing Needs. 
* Commercial i Residential Acoustical 
A
 Ceiling Products • 
f Building Insulation 
V Faced Metal Building 
Insulation Products 
• Air Handling Products for 
Residential k Commercial 
Ventilating Bualnesses 
• Energy Saving Products and 
Accessories for the Building 
Material Retailer and Builder 
• Fabricated Insulation Products for 
Original Equipment Manufacturer 
• Commercial Roofing Products 
• Residential Roofing Products 
• Mobile Home Insulation Products 
• Industrial insulation Products 
e Resins and Reinforcements for the 
Flberalaa Reinforced Plastic 
Manufacturer 
r .TTTTTI i I ! I 1 OWENS-CORNINQ FIBERGLAS SUPPLY DIVISION 
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1 
1 1 1 1 
snipped 
oty. 
1 
\MU 
"""v 
T 
weight' 
.«_j?ns33wwfc 
J) evnns / peRmaGLRS 
PRODUCTS company 
TYPE IV 
**J£] 
IS 
• d 
w 
25 
O 
H 
X 
oo 
v. 
I 3 
J; 
jSs 
r * ' 
ifactured to meet or exceed the standards of ASTM D-217M6Type 
IE SQUARE COVERS 100 SQUARE FEET OF ROOF ARE* 
IMPORTANT 
HANDLING AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS 
A. Store off the ground and protect from the weather. 
B. Apply only to dry, clean, smooth surfaces. 
C. Do not apply damp or wet materials. 
D. Do not apply wrinkled or cracked materials. 
E. Weather conditions such as tempgrfgure, sun, wind, etc., 
must be given consideration. If the fenfyerature drops below 
50°F., crocking, wrinkling, ndha^hetflon. and fish mouths 
are more likely to occur. ** -. - \ * 
•,' ' *» 
F. Apply in hot asphalt as part of ijp assembly In accordance 
with evnns PRODUCT* %f>*Hmf*GL*s 
published specifications. * S^ '' 
G. Do not lay on sides. StaniJ on ends only. 
N. Do not store more than two pallets high. 
evRns PRODUCTS company cannot be responsible for 
results when the above precautions arp not taken. 
(37) GVPUIS I PGRmRGLRS 
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o: „„„ 
romi 
ubject: 
MEmunMi^uurvi 
Jut
 L icHTiE _ _ _ _ Date J t J N E 1 4 t X9t 
ROLF KUEPPER 
ROOFERS • PRICE MOTEL 
DESERET ( 2 6 6 - 1 6 0 1 ) THEY NEED TO FINISH LP A JOB 
*»<=. : N WILL BE ON PRICE JOB THl JRSDAY f, WfW Ti-FDUGH 
IQ^EZ '7 '-iEu ' - A ^ E K » 
; NS< >RAN: :- .. -• A G G R E S S * 
CONCERNING CJMMITME--.! V — - . ^ .,..., . . . J ^ - - ~u CHECr, u R Y - I N f 
SHE STATED THAT THEY DID NCT hA;E ANYONE TO SE"*; I TOLD HER THAT 
WE WOULD MONITOR THE DRY-IN AND I * , r*' ' ' V . -5 'S -RE INC JRRED 
W E W I L L A D D j o INSURANCE CLAIM. 
W 
MR. BILL HENDRICKS, 
DFSERET ROOFING : > 
Copies 
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